During the last few years, a number of authenticated group key agreement protocols have been proposed in the literature. We observed that the efforts in this domain were mostly dedicated to the improvement of their performance in term of bandwidth or computational requirements, but that there were very few systematic studies on their security properties. In this paper, we tried to develop a systematic way to analyse protocol suites extending the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange scheme to a group setting and presented in the context of the Cliques project. This led us to propose a very simple machinery that allowed us to manually pinpoint several unpublished attacks against the main security properties claimed in the definition of these protocols (implicit key agreement, perfect forward secrecy, resistance to known-key attacks).
Introduction
An Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocol (AGKAP for short) is a protocol enabling a group of users to generate a shared secret key on a network possibly controlled by an active attacker. Very often, AGKAP's are defined together with a number of "subprotocols" enabling dynamic changes in group constitution ( [2] , [6] , [11] ). Although the experience has shown how complex it is to define security protocols that can be used in the presence of active attackers (see [8] , [12] for instance), AGKAP's have rarely been systematically studied until now: only sketch proofs or informal arguments were given to convince of their correctness in their presentation ( [2] , [11] ).
Two types of methods, coming from two little related communities, have been developed for the study of security protocols. "Cryptographic" approaches have been proposed to analyse these protocols: we can notably mention the work of Bellare and Rogaway [3] that has been extended by Blake-Wilson, Johnson and Menezes [4] in order to enable the handling of the authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange. More recently, Bresson et al. [5, 6] further extended these methods for the analysis of AGKAP's. In these approaches, cryptographic operations are considered as functions on bit strings and security properties are expressed in terms of probability and computational complexity of successful attacks. Unfortunately, proofs using such methods are often laborious and do not render pointless the development of analysis methods for reasoning at a higher level of abstraction. In these methods, security properties are formally (logically) modelled and cryptographic operations are viewed as functions on a space of symbolic expressions. These analyses allowed researchers to capture a lot of useful intuitions about security protocols and discover many new flaws by considering only idealized cryptographic primitives and without precisely taking into account the computational capabilities of the intruder (first attempts to bridge the gap between these two views of cryptography can be found in [1] and [10] for example). The methods we are using in this paper can be placed in the second category although they capture arithmetic properties at a level of abstraction lower than the one usually considered in this type of methods. This will be discussed more extensively in section 4. This paper is organised as follows: we begin in section 2 by examining the main security properties of interest for these protocols. Then, in section 3, we will describe the A-GDH.2 protocol suite [2] whose security is based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. In order to analyse these protocols, we will develop in section 4 a very simple machinery that will allow us to reduce the problem of the verification of security properties to the resolution of a linear equation system. In sections 5 and 6, we analyse two suites of protocols proposed in the context of the Cliques project [2] : the A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 suites. Our analysis will allow us to pinpoint several new attacks against all protocols we analysed.
Intended Security Properties
The execution of an AGKAP session allows a set of users M to generate a shared group key. This key must remain secret even in the presence of an active attacker that is able to eavesdrop or intercept messages, as well as to send messages he generated using the information he possesses.
The main desirable security properties for these protocols are the following:
Implicit Key Authentication
When he completed his role in a protocol session, each M i ∈ M is assured that no party M q / ∈ M can learn the key S n (M i ) (i.e. M i 's view of the key) unless helped by a dishonest M j ∈ M .
This property does not mean that the group members have any knowl-edge of the group key at the end of the protocol, nor that they agree on its value. Also, it does not imply for a group member that any other member executed a session of the protocol (there is no liveness property intended in the sense of G. Lowe in [13] ).
Perfect Forward Secrecy
This property is defined in [18] as follows: the compromise of long-term keys does not compromise past session keys. This property, traditionally used in a two parties setting, is exploited in a context where no message was manipulated in the past. This is natural since the two users cannot exchange messages if they do not agree on the value of the key. However, things are slightly different in a multiparty setting: the manipulation of a message can alter the view of the key of one particular user, while all the other group members are computing the same key; and this manipulation does not prevent these last users from communicating.
So, we propose to define two flavours of perfect forward secrecy: complete forward secrecy and individual forward secrecy. According to the former, no message have been manipulated in the past for any member of the group; but according the latter, one (or a few) members of the group may have been subject to attacks which left unaffected the other members of the group (and thus the protocol was individually correct for each of them). This scenario is plausible since, after executing the protocol, the attacked individuals may just be passive recipients of the messages exchanged by the others.
Resistance to Known-Key Attacks
This property is defined in [18] as follows: a protocol is said to be vulnerable to a known-key attack if compromise of past session keys allows either a passive adversary to compromise future session keys, or impersonation by an active adversary in the future.
One of the principal motivations for the definition of this property is the protection of future sessions against the compromise of session secrets usually weakly protected than long-term ones.
However, in the protocols we will analyse, the session keys are not the only session secrets: each user generates a contribution to the session key that is also kept secret. So, we think it judicious to consider whether security problems can result in further sessions of the compromise of any secret local to a past session (rather than only of the compromise of session keys).
We will now describe the first AGKAP we will analyse.
The A-GDH.2 Protocol Suite
The suite of protocols we will be studying here is the A-GDH.2 suite that has been proposed within the scope of the Cliques project (see [2] for instance). The main A-GDH.2 protocol (that will be referenced as the A-GDH.2 protocol in the rest of this paper) allows a group of users to agree on a contributively generated key. The other protocols of the suite permit the addition of new members in the group (A-GDH.2-MA), the removal of a member, the fusion of two groups, etc.
All proposed GDH protocols are based on the difficulty of a single problem: the Diffie-Hellman decision (DDH) problem (i.e. given a large integer p and knowing α x mod p and α y mod p, it is hard to distinguish α xy mod p from a random number). All arithmetic throughout this paper will be performed in a cyclic group G of prime order q which is typically (but not necessarily) a subgroup of Z * p for a prime p such that p = kq + 1 for small k ∈ N (e.g. k = 2).
We assume that p, q and α are public, and that every user M i shares (or is able to share) with each M j a distinct secret K ij . For example, we can set K ij = F (α x i x j mod p) where x i is a secret long-term exponent selected by every M i and α x i mod p is the corresponding long-term public key. We will now describe the first two protocols studied in this paper: the Key Generation and the Member Adding protocols (the other protocols of the suite are not described in detail in the literature).
The A-GDH.2 Protocol
Let M = {M 1 , . . . , M n } be a set of users wishing to share a key S n . The A-GDH.2 protocol executes in n rounds. In the first stage (n − 1 rounds), contributions are collected from individual group members and then, in the second stage (n-th round), the group keying material is broadcast. The actual protocol is as follows:
Initialization:
Let p be a prime integer and q a prime divisor of p − 1. Let G be the unique cyclic subgroup of Z * p of order q, and let α be a generator of G.
Round n:
Upon receipt of the above, every M i computes the group key as:
This protocol is intended to provide the security properties described in section 2 excepted the Resistance to Known-Key Attacks where implausible attack schemes are suggested. In order to better understand its structure, we represented a protocol run with four participants in Fig. 1 .
α r 2 r 3 r 4 K 14 ,α r 1 r 3 r 4 K 24 ,α r 1 r 2 r 4 K 34 From this figure, we can observe that the behaviour of the participants is quite repetitive. If we except the first one, each group member M i receives several elements of G, exponentiate them with a random contribution, and forwards the result to the next group member. The group controller (i.e. the last group member, M 4 in our example) performs two operations more: he keeps the last exponentiated element to compute his view of the key and exponentiates the others with the long-term keys he shares with the n − 1 first group members. When receiving the final broadcast, these users compute their view of the group key by exponentiating anew an element of this message with a product of keys and random numbers.
The A-GDH.2-MA Protocol
Let M = M 1 , . . . , M n be a set of users sharing a key S n and assume that M n+1 is wishing to join the group. The A-GDH.2-MA protocol executes in 2 rounds: in the first one, M n sends to M n+1 a message computed from the one he broadcast in the last round of the A-GDH.2 protocol and from the old key while in the second round, M n+1 broadcasts the new keying material to the group. The actual protocol is as follows:
Round 2:
Upon receipt of the above, every M i computes the new group key as:
The security properties of the A-GDH.2 protocol have to be preserved after execution of this protocol. Fig. 2 represents a protocol run where a fifth member is added to the previously represented group. We can observe on this figure that the first three elements of the first round of this protocol are those of the broadcast of the setup protocol exponentiated withr 4 .
A Model for the Analysis of the Cliques Protocols 4.1 Introduction
A number of methods were developed during the last few years for the formal (or logical) analysis of security protocols. Many of them are based on state-space exploration: they usually proceed by defining an arbitrarily bounded system and exploring it hoping (or after having proved) that if there is an error in the protocol, it can be described by a behaviour included in the considered state-space ( [9] , [14] , [15] , . . . ). However several tools allow proofs to be obtained for unbounded systems at the cost of the interactive proof of several lemmas [16] or of the risk of receiving no answer for some protocols [21] . Other approaches are based on the use of logics ( [20] , [22] , . . . ). They allow proofs to be obtained for arbitrary size configurations, but they often require particularly error-prone formalization steps and do not provide the same support in pinpointing problems as the direct generation of counter examples. Recently, "manual" approaches were presented, allowing fine-grained proofs to be obtained for systems containing an unbounded number of occurrences of each defined roles (see [23] for example). In order to make such proofs feasible, several simplifying assumptions are typically stated: a very limited set of cryptographic primitives is considered (typically public-key and symmetric-key encryption), and these primitives are usually idealized in such a way that they act as black-boxes (ignoring low-level properties such as the multiplicative structure of RSA or the characteristics of the chaining method used in symmetric-key encryption for example). The use of state-space exploration techniques in the study of group protocols seems very difficult due to their very essence: the number of participants in a honest session of the protocol is basically unbounded. This will intuitively result in dramatic state-space explosion problems. As far as we know, the only successful analyses of group protocols have been performed by theorem proving approaches ( [7] , [19] ), which allow inductive reasoning. Besides this, C. Meadows has performed (independently of us) the analysis of the A-GDH.2 protocol, adapting her NRL Protocol analyzer by extending the power and scope of its theorem-proving capabilities [17] .
Beyond the problem of the unbounded number of participants in the protocols, the modelling of the A-GDH.2 protocols suite requires to capture several low-level arithmetic properties: exponentiation, commutativity, associativity, that are out of the scope of most of the works encountered in the literature. Furthermore, the A-GDH.2 key generation protocol is not intended to be used alone: there are several other protocols in the suite (member addition, . . . ) that use values computed during the key generation protocol and can interfere with its security properties.
In the next paragraphs, we first introduce the way we model the exchanged messages, then we describe the intruder capabilities and, finally, we show how the intended security properties can be verified.
Messages and Intruder's Knowledge
The messages sent during the execution of the protocols we are analysing are constituted by the concatenation of elements of a group G of prime order q. A particular element, that we will denote α, is a generator of G and is shared by all users of the network (as well as the knowledge of the characteristics of the group G). All exchanged elements of G are expressed as powers of α mod p. It can then be checked that the participants have to manipulate three types of elements:
• Elements of G expressed as α raised to the power of a product of random numbers and long-term keys.
The behaviour of the honest participants is quite simple: they receive elements of G, exponentiate them with random numbers and/or long-term keys (possibly inverted), and send the result to other participants. The group-key is obtained in the same manner, except that the result of the computations is not sent but kept secret. It can be noticed that when a participant receives an element of G, he has to accept it without being able to check anything concerning its constitution or origin. The goal of an intruder will therefore be to possess a pair (α x , α y ) of elements of G related between them in such a way that α y is equal to the result of the key-computation operation of a honest M i applied to α x . If we take this point of view, there are n secret pairs corresponding to an execution of the protocol between n parties.
Example: If we refer to Fig. 1, the Since all properties of the protocols we are analysing can be described in terms of relation between elements of G, our model will not deal with elements of G but with the possible relations between pairs of them: the pair (α x , α y ) will be modeled as the ratio y/x.
More precisely, our model considers the manipulation of two sets of elements:
• The set E containing the random numbers r i and the long-term keys
jl |e i , e jl ∈ Z} that we will use to represent the relation between elements of G: r ∈ R will represent the pairs of elements of G that can be written as (α x , α rx ) for any value of x.
Example: With our notations, the secret pair corresponding to the secret of M 1 in Fig. 1 will be represented by the element
The use of such a construction will be quite convenient and can be intuitively justified if we state a hypothesis that is quite similar to the widely used "perfect encryption assumption". We will refer to this hypothesis as the "perfect Diffie-Hellman assumption" and it can be stated as follows:
"An element of G can be computed in one and only way: by exponentiating the generator α with the correct random numbers and keys (excepted the permutations in the order of the exponentiation of α and the possibility of exponentiation by an element of E and by its inverse successively)."
This assumption implies in particular that a secret element of G cannot be computed by combining other elements of G (but only elements of E with elements of G). It seems quite plausible in practice given that we work within a large group (lucky guesses or collisions are very unlikely) and that the DDH problem is hard.
It can also be noticed that the use of the R-set implies another restriction due to its very structure: it does not allow capturing relations between more than two elements of G. However, in the presence of our perfect DiffieHellman assumption, the relevant security properties always come down to the impossibility of finding two elements of G presenting between them a particular relation, so that the consideration of more complex relations cannot be of any help to prove the correctness of Cliques protocols. It could be useful to use such extensions to discover more dangerous attacks that violate more than one security property, but we are more interested in checking the correctness of protocols than finding "optimal" attack sketches.
We will now be looking at the ways that the intruder can use to manipulate our two sets of elements.
Intruder Capabilities
Considering our "perfect Diffie-Hellman assumption", the only useful computation for the intruder will be the exponentiation of an element of G by a known element of E. If we note E I and R I the subsets of elements of E and R (respectively) that are known by the intruder, we can then transpose this remark as follows:
(1) If e ∈ E I and r ∈ R I then r.e ∈ R I and r.e −1 ∈ R I
There is another way for the intruder to obtain new elements of R: the use of the computations executed by the honest users. As we said above, the behaviour of these users is quite simple: they receive elements of G and exponentiate them with some values of E. We will call such operations services. More precisely, a service is a function s : G → G : α x → α p.x , and we call S the set of available services. For simplicity purposes, we will refer to the service s(α x ) → α xp by the power it raises its input: p ∈ S. Let us see how a service can be described in term of growth of R I . If r ∈ R I , then the intruder possesses two elements of G that can be written α x and α rx . If the intruder sends α x to a honest user performing the service p, then he will learn the element p −1 .r ∈ R I . Conversely, if the intruder sends α rx to the user performing the same service, he will learn the element p.r ∈ R I . We can then write our second rule for the increasing of the R I -set:
(2) If p ∈ S, and r ∈ R I then r.p ∈ R I and r.p −1 ∈ R I
Nevertheless we have to be careful in the use of this rule and impose some restrictions in its application due to the fact that honest users provide several services in parallel but only once. This will be examined more in the detail in the next section where we will propose a method to determine if a ratio is secret or can be obtained by the intruder.
Proving Security Properties
In the context of the Cliques protocols, the most general message transformation provided by a user during a single round can be written as follows:
This view can be used to express the rules limiting the composition of services in the derivation of the set R I :
• The (2)-rule can be used at most once for each service.
• If two services p 1 and p 2 are offered during the same round and take distinct inputs (i.e. are applied to distinct α x i ), then they can be used on a single element r ∈ R I to produce the following elements: 
2 )
• If two services p 1 and p 2 are offered during the same round and take the same inputs (i.e. are applied to the same α x i ), then they can be used to produce the following elements:
2 . It can be noticed that these elements are independent from any previously known element of R I .
• If two services p 1 and p 2 are offered independently of any input (as α y i in our example), then they can be used to obtain p 1 , p 2 , p −1
2 . This restriction has to be observed even if p 1 and p 2 are provided during different rounds of the protocol.
From these considerations, we can suggest a systematic scheme to obtain the proof of the secrecy of a particular r ∈ R, i.e. to prove that some element of R cannot be obtained from the initial knowledge of the intruder by using the two rules we defined in the previous section.
Definition of the system
At first, we define the system we will analyse: we fix the sessions of the protocol we consider and the intended roles for each user. This allows us to define the available services (S-set), the atomic elements initially known by the intruder (E I -set), and the secret ratios (let R S be this set).
Example: Let us consider the system containing the session represented in Fig. 1 and assume that r 3 is compromised (because of the compromising of the pseudo-random generator of M 3 for example).
During the first three rounds, the user M i provides the service r i ∈ S several times in parallel. During the fourth round, M 4 provides 3 services: r 4 K 14 , r 4 K 24 and r 4 K 34 . The secret of
i4 while the secret of M 4 is r 4 . So, to summarize, the sets we will consider are the following:
The service r 2 can be seen in two ways: we will assume in the rest of this paper that α r 2 is computed by exponentiating the term α that M 2 receives from M 1 (without checking the correctness of this value) rather than by generating a new term. Assuming this last way of executing the protocol should only change minor details in the further developments (i.e. some attacks that can be performed against n − 1 group members will only be applicable against n − 2 group members).
Use of the (1)-rule
All elements corresponding to those of E I can be deleted from the expression of S and R S . This operation simplifies the problem and does not change its solutions since:
• If e ∈ E I , every operation that uses the service e i y ∈ S (i ∈ Z) can be performed by using a service y and by suitably applying the (1)-rule.
• If e ∈ E I , and r.e a ∈ R S then the knowledge of r implies the one of r.e a (anew by applying (1)-rule).
We will call the resulting sets S 1 and R 1 S .
Example: Applying this step to the sets obtained in the previous example provides:
We can observe that the service r 3 completely disappeared. The reason is that that service is not useful anymore if r 3 is known by the intruder.
Use of the (2)-rule
The problem is now to determine whether some element of R 1 S can be obtained from S 1 by suitably exploiting the (2)-rule.
The secrecy of a particular element of R S can be determined by writing a linear system expressing the "balance" of the variables in the construction of the secret from the services. This system contains one variable per element of S 1 and one equation per element in E. On the left side of the equation, the value of each element of the system is the power of the element of E corresponding to the line in the element of S 1 corresponding to the column. The second term of each equation is the power of the element of E corresponding to the line in the studied secret. This system expresses that the only way to compute the secret is to successively apply some services starting form the only initially known ratio: 1. If this system is inconsistent, then the intended confidentiality property is verified (in our model, and for the considered system). If this is not the case, we have to check the restrictions on the use of services described above and verify whether the initially known ratios are not combined in an inconsistent way. If these conditions are satisfied, then an attack scheme can be constructed by exploiting the known elements of E and the offered services as indicated by the solution(s) of the linear system. This construction will be exemplified in section 5.1.2.
Example: If we apply this last step on the previous example, the linear system corresponding to the verification of the secrecy of r 1 K 
It can be observed that this linear system has no solution since the last four equations are inconsistent. So, we are not able to obtain the secret r 1 K
−1
14 from the studied system.
We will now see how this scheme can be applied for the analysis of the A-GDH.2 protocols suite.
Analysis of the A-GDH.2 Protocols
In the following paragraphs, we will analyse the three security properties of the A-GDH.2 key generation protocol described in section 2. Then, we will extend our analysis to the consideration of the concurrent use of the A-GDH.2-MA protocol.
Implicit Key Authentication
We will divide our analysis in two parts: in the first one we will assume that the intruder is not a member of any group, while in the other we will consider that the intruder is a legitimate member of some groups.
IKA when the intruder is excluded from all groups
As described in the previous section, the first step in our analysis will be the description of the protocol.
Initially, we will consider only one session of the protocol with n participants. The intruder knowing no long-term keys nor any short-term secrets, the E I -set is to be empty. From the first to the (n−1)-th round, the user M i provides the service r i ∈ S several times in parallel. During the n-th round, M n provides the n − 1 services: r n K 1n , . . . , r n K n−1n . The secrets are the following:
in for M i (1 ≤ i < n) and r n for M n . So, to summarize, the sets we consider are the following:
If we follow the analysis scheme proposed above, we now have to express the linear system describing the "balance" of the variables of E to check the secrecy of the elements of R S . We will first look at the secrecy of r 1 K
−1 1n
(so we need the balance on r 1 and K 1n being equal to 1 and −1 respectively while the balance on the other variables must be null). If we use the "s"-letter to denote the variable indicating how many times the service s has to be used to construct the secret, the linear system can be written as follows:
It can be observed that summing the n−1 equations corresponding to the balance on the keys provides an inconsistency with the equation expressing the balance on r n . Hence we can say that r 1 K −1 1n cannot be obtained by using the two enrichment rules we defined and S n (M 1 ) is kept secret in our model as claimed in the protocol definition. If we write this system in the case of multiple sessions of the protocol (from which the intruder is excluded), it can easily be checked that this inconsistency is preserved. The transposition of this result for the
in -secrets is straightforward and if we transform the second members of these equations in order to prove the secrecy of r n , we can easily obtain an inconsistency between the same equations. We can then say that the Implicit Key Authentication property is correct with respect to our model provided that the intruder is not a member of any group.
IKA when the intruder is a legitimate member of some groups
We will now check if this property is preserved when the intruder is a member of some groups. As a simple scenario, we will assume a first session of the protocol in which M 1 , M 2 , M I and M 3 are the intended participants (M 3 being the group controller), and a second session with the same participants excepted M I . We will note r i the random contribution generated by M i during this last session. So, the sets of interest become:
The application of the second step of our proof scheme provides the following sets:
If we solve the three corresponding linear systems (i.e. one system per element of R S ), a number of solutions can be found.
We will give the example of the verification of the secrecy of r 2 K −1 23 . The linear system corresponding to this secret is the following one:
A solution to this linear system is:
while all other variables are null. It can be checked that all restrictions defined in section 4.4 are respected, so we can build an attack from this solution.
To build this solution, we firstly have to exploit two services of the first session: r 3 K 23 and r 3 K I3 (this last service is the one from which the r 3 -term of the solution comes). These services are provided by M 3 when he forms the final broadcast, and we have to exploit them in opposite directions (since the value of the variables indicating how they have to be used is 1 and −1 in the solution).
So, the intruder will choose an element of G, say α x , and place it in the message that M 3 receives in such a way that M 3 will exponentiate α x with r 3 K 23 and r 3 K I3 , providing the values α xr 3 K 23 and α xr 3 K I3 . The last term can be exponentiated by the intruder in order to obtain the pair (α xr 3 K 23 , α xr 3 ) that corresponds to the ratio K −1 23 ∈ R I . During the second session, the intruder has to use the r 2 service in the positive direction. This service is provided by M 2 during the second round, so the intruder will replace an element that M 2 receives from the first round with α xr 3 and M 2 will send α xr 3 r 2 .
Finally, the intruder possesses a pair (α xr 3 K 23 , α xr 3 r 2 ) that corresponds to the secret of M 2 during the second session. So, if he replaces the term of the broadcast intended to M 2 with α xr 3 K 23 , M 2 will compute α xr 3 r 2 as the (secret) group key; and this term is known by the intruder.
An instantiation of this scenario where M I has chosen α x to be equal to α r 1 r 2 is represented in Fig. 3 . The key computed by the group controller M 3 can be obtained by using the following solution of the linear system:
We can observe that giving the second place in the first session to M I (instead of the third) does not change anything to the equations we solved. In fact, this would only change the number of times services are provided in parallel, what does not affect the secrecy of particular element. Moreover, the solutions we described remain valid when considering larger groups.
It can also be observed that a similar scenario can be applied in parallel against all members of the first group, and thus that the intruder is able to share a (different) key simultaneously with all members of the second group (from which he is normally excluded).
To conclude, the implicit key authentication property seems to be very problematic in this protocol as soon as the intruder is a member of a group and intended to be excluded from another non disjoint group.
We will now analyse the other security properties, considering that the intruder is not a member of any group.
Perfect Forward Secrecy
We will divide our analysis in two parts, considering successively the two flavours of perfect forward secrecy that we described in section 2.
Complete Forward Secrecy
In the study of this property, we will assume that a session of the protocol has been executed in the past, and that E I contains all long-term keys K in . To simplify our writings, we are considering anew a system with one session of four legitimate participants, but the results can be easily extended to a group of size n.
Since the session has been executed in the past without any manipulation, the intruder only receives a set of values corresponding to all transmitted elements of G. Furthermore, the group key computed by the different users is not the result of the exponentiation of an unknown element with some secret value: since the intruder cannot influence this session, each user is computing the same key: α r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 . The sets of interest are therefore: 
The second step of our proof scheme will allow us to delete all keys from these sets. However, our fourth restriction on the use of the services (section 4.4) imposes that the only element of R I that can be obtained from S are those corresponding to elements of S or to one element of S multiplied by the inverse of another one. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient to obtain r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 .
It can be easily verified that considering several sessions with any number of participants does not help to obtain a solution to the problem. So, if the intruder is not allowed to participate to any session, the complete forward secrecy property is verified from our model's point of view.
Individual Forward Secrecy
In the previous section, we considered that the sessions executed before the compromise of the long-term keys had not been manipulated by the intruder. Now, we will consider that the intruder is able to manipulate the previous sessions for one (or a few) group participants leaving these sessions correct for the other ones.
For simplicity purposes, we will anew assume a system containing only one session with four participants: M 1 , M 2 , M 3 and M 4 . We will assume that the services can be exploited and that the long-term keys are compromised. So, the sets of interest are:
If we delete the keys from these sets (as described in the second step of our proof-scheme), we can find that for each secret r i , the resulting linear system has a trivial solution: r i = 1. These solutions meet all restrictions described above, and we can then assume that the individual forward secrecy is somehow suspicious.
We first consider the solution r 4 = 1 that corresponds to the secret of M 4 . This service is in fact offered three times, when M 4 forms the broadcast by exponentiating the terms he receives with r 4 K 14 , r 4 K 24 and r 4 K 34 . These three services can be used indifferently, and we will choose to use the first one. So, the intruder replaces the term that M 4 will use to compute its view of the key by any element of G (say α x ) and replaces the term that M 4 will exponentiate with r 4 K 14 by the same element. A representation of this scenario where the intruder has chosen α x to be α r 1 r 2 r 3 can be found in Fig. 4 . 
Resistance to known-keys attacks
This property expresses that the compromising of session keys does not allow a passive adversary to compromise keys of other sessions nor an active adversary to impersonate one of the protocol parties. The part of this property concerning the passive adversary is studied in [2] and we will focus on the second part. However the authors of [2] claim that the resistance to an active adversary is more dubious and suggest an attack that does not seem very useful in practice.
We will apply our method to the verification of this property as follows: we are assuming two sessions of the protocol with the same four participants. The random numbers generated by M i during the first and second sessions of the protocol will be denoted r i and r i respectively. In order to model the compromise of the session keys, we will assume that the users are providing services corresponding to the secrets of the first session: 
The linear system corresponding to
where 1 ≤ j < 4 and δ(i, j) = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. It can be checked that:
, r i = 1 and all other services being unused, is a solution.
If i = 1, it is however impossible to find an attack scheme: this solution would need the service r 1 K −1 14 (i.e. the service corresponding to the key computed by M 1 during the first session) to be applied on the value α r 1 that is provided during the second session. Nevertheless, for all other values of i, the following attack is possible:
1. Let α x be one of the input terms of the i-th round of the first protocol run. M i will therefore send α xr i .
The intruder replaces then the term
will be equal to α
in . Since we study known-key attacks, we will assume that this value is compromised. 3. In the second run of the protocol, the intruder replaces one of the i-th round inputs with α
in r i . 4. In the broadcast of the second run of the protocol, the intruder finally replaces the term intended to M i with α xr i (obtained in the first step of our scenario). Hence S n (M i ) will be computed as α
in r i that has been obtained during the third step of our scenario.
At the end of this scenario, the intruder will possess a key that M i believes to be secret. However this key is unknown to the rest of the group and the compromised key used is a malformed key which reduces the scope of these attacks. However, if all malformed keys are available, the intruder can perform this attack simultaneously against almost all members of the group.
We can now turn to the secrecy of r n . If we look at the linear system corresponding to this secret (i.e. the system we just described where the right part of each equation has been updated), we can find two types of solutions. The first one is:
From these solutions, we can obtain the scenarios corresponding to the attack proposed in [2] . The scope of these attacks is the same as the one we just described.
However another type of solution can be found:
For 1 ≤ i < 4, it is possible to apply the following scenario:
1. In the last round inputs of the protocol's first session, the intruder replaces α r 1 ...r 3 /r i with α r 1 r 2 r 3 . Hence all elements of the broadcast will be preserved except the one intended to M i that will be equal to α r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 K i4 . S 4 (M 4 ) will therefore be equal to α r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 and shared by all members of the group except M i . In a context of known-key attacks, we will assume that this key is compromised. 2. In the last round inputs of the protocol's second session, the intruder will substitute α r 1 r 2 r 3 /r i with α r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 and α r 1 r 2 r 3 with α r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 K i4 .
Hence M 4 will broadcast α r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 K i4 r 4 and compute his view of the key S 4 (M 4 ) = α r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 K i4 r 4 .
A representation of this attack for i = 1 can be found in Fig. 6 . This 
Consideration of the Use of the A-GDH.2-MA Protocol
The key generation protocol (A-GDH.2) is not intended to be used alone: it is often useful to enable the addition or deletion of group members after the initial group creation. New protocols will be used in order to provide each of these services. As we said above, the aim of the A-GDH.2-MA protocol is the addition of a new member in the group. In this paragraph, we will extend our analysis of the A-GDH.2 protocol by taking into account the presence of the Member Adding protocol. As a first step, we will study the Implicit Key Authentication property and consider two sessions of the protocols: in the first session, the A-GDH.2 protocol is executed by M 1 , M 2 and M 3 ; while in the second session a member is added to this group. Following the same approach as above, we will first write the sets S, E I and R S that will be the union of those corresponding to the sessions of each protocol: 
}
The first part of the expression of S corresponds to the execution of the key-generation protocol, the second to the first round of the A-GDH.2-MA In order to better understand the structure of this protocol, we represented a protocol run with four participants in Fig. 8 .
If we look at the equation system for the secret of M 2 for instance, we
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we presented a number of attacks against authenticated group key agreement protocols. Most of them are coming from the fact that the properties of group protocols are not trivial extensions of the ones of twoparties protocols: for instance, the fact that a group member computes a bad key can remain unnoticed, particularly if the group is large, while it prevents any exchange of messages when only two users are considered. The discovery of all these vulnerabilities emphasizes the need of using systematic methods for reasoning about security protocols.
Due to their particular structure, the analysis of the GDH protocols (A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2) required the development of a new machinery. We discovered that within some reasonable extensions of the idealizations usually stated in the context of formal approaches for protocol analysis, and by adequately modeling the operations performed by the honest users during the protocol sessions, it was particularly easy to verify the security properties of these protocols since it came down to solving a linear equation system.
Trying to draw lessons from all the weaknesses we encountered, we are currently working on the definition of a protocol that would be able to provide the security properties we examined throughout this paper.
